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Abstract 
 
Increasingly, state crime scholarship frames criminality as a social property that attaches to 
particular illegitimate state practices through a mediated process of struggle from below. 
Building on this foundation, the following paper presents a comparative study of two cases – 
using a range of primary materials – where sabotage was deployed by social movements to 
dramatically stigmatise illegitimate state-corporate conduct. In order to understand the 
symbolic and practical significance of this exchange, a theory of indifference will be 
developed. It will be argued that in the cases observed sabotage acted as a device which 
social movements could employ to impose a sense of consequence on organisational actors 
otherwise indifferent to, and alienated from, the significant harms their operations’ produced. 
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Within state crime studies significant disagreement still exists over what constitutes state 
crime (Green and Ward, 2014). Scholars grounded in criteria-based traditions, have tended to 
distinguish criminal state practices through appeals to international law and human rights 
principles. In contrast, a dialectical tradition of state crime scholarship contends that the 
establishment of conduct norms only generates the possibility of state crime – its 
actualisation, as a social property, requires a practical moment of censure and sanction 
operationalised by organised communities of resistance. 
 
Informed by the latter tradition, this paper draws on a comparative study of two social 
movements, both of which employed sabotage as a dramatic technique to censure and 
prohibit deviant state-corporate practices. The first case centres upon events that took place 
on 9 August 2006, when nine Derry anti-war activists (Raytheon 9) entered the Northern 
Ireland Software Centre run by arms manufacturer, Raytheon, and poured water onto a 
computer mainframe. They aimed to disrupt and censure the Israel Defence Force’s use of 
Raytheon built guided bomb units, which, at the time, were striking civilian targets in 
southern Lebanon. The second case occurred eighteen years earlier on the island of 
Bougainville,1 where landowner activists used dynamite to close a large copper mine 
operated by Rio Tinto subsidiary, Bougainville Copper Limited (Bougainville Copper), 
which stood accused of ecocide. While the two campaigns are culturally and temporally 
distant they are outstanding examples of the power of the social audience in defining crimes 
of the powerful, and the dialectical nature of state crime. 
 
Employing a range of primary materials, this article compares these two campaigns in order 
to examine the circumstances that prompt movements of resistance to draw on sabotage as a 
method to censure state-corporate deviance. Consideration will also be given to the symbolic 
3  
  
and practical exchanges which enable sabotage, on occasions, to exact a stigmatising effect. 
To help conceptualise the social content of this exchange we will develop a materialist theory 
of indifference drawing upon Marx. In particular, it will be argued that sabotage was 
employed by movements of resistance to impose a sense of consequence on organisational 
actors otherwise indifferent to, and alienated from, the significant harms their operations’ 
produced. To assist contextualise our theoretical intervention, we will first survey key 
contributions on state crime, resistance and censure, before examining the notion of 
indifference in Marx’s thought.  
 
Resistance, censure and indifference 
 
State crime and resistance 
 
Since state crime studies emerged as a distinct field during the 1990s, scholars have 
attempted to develop a robust foundation for conceptualising state crime. Two distinct 
conceptual approaches have emerged to date.  
 
The first of these approaches – which we label criteria-based – draws on international legal 
norms as a defensible criteria for distinguishing criminal state practices. For example, Cohen 
argues that the label state crime should be reserved for ‘“gross” violations of human rights – 
genocide, mass political killings, state terrorism, torture, disappearances’ (1993: 98). Other 
authors have opted for a more codified approach. Kramer and Michalowski (2005) for 
instance suggest that international law constitutes the strongest foundation for defining state 
crime, ‘even when they do not violate domestic law’ (2005: 447). While differing in scope, 
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these interventions share a common commitment to differentiating criminal state acts on the 
basis of their extra-normative or illegal character  
 
In contrast a dialectical approach has emerged which frames state crime as a historical 
property that is inscribed on certain practices and regimes, through a mediated process of 
struggle. This approach is underpinned by a number of conceptual innovations pioneered by 
Marx during the 1840s, specifically the centrality of motion, practice and contradiction to 
social analysis, all of which have informed in important ways the dialectical tradition of state 
crime scholarship. The first, articulation of the dialectical approach appeared in a series of 
papers authored by Green and Ward in 2000. Their conceptualisation of state crime is 
organised around three core categories – legitimacy, human rights and deviancy.  
 
Legitimacy alerts us to the fact, Green and Ward observe, that if states are to govern with 
some semblance of consent, they must accept and abide by certain conduct norms (2000: 
108). Their argument here draws on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, which characterises the 
state as the concentrated expression of bourgeoisie class power, as well as a contested space 
where social reproduction is organised through material compromises and ideological 
discourses that temporarily diffuse class antagonisms (Ward and Green, 2000: 80). Drawing 
on this insight, Green and Ward suggest, states must concede to be governed by certain 
norms, if they are to uphold the appearance of neutrality essential to their consent-forging 
role. Importantly for these scholars, human rights have now become one of the most powerful 
normative frameworks to which states’ must subscribe (Green and Ward, 2000: 109).  
 
Yet, while states must concede to certain social norms, the antagonisms and ruptures that are 
an enduring and systemic feature of capitalism, frequently prompt their contravention. At this 
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moment in the argument Green and Ward engrain a sense of momentum and agency into their 
approach. The breach of norms, they argue, does not in itself inscribe state practices with the 
quality of being criminal, rather it is the struggles that emerge in response to these deviant 
acts which stigmatise state practices, and the regimes that author them, as being wrong. 
Green and Ward, in this respect, break with criminology’s traditional bias towards official 
judgements administered by the state, and argue, ‘deviancy labels and informal sanctions can 
… be applied “from below” to state action that is perceived as illegitimate’ (2000: 105).  
 
Building on Green and Ward’s research agenda, an emerging tract of state crime scholarship 
grouped around the concept of resistance, is indeed now examining in greater detail the civil 
society configurations that censure illegitimate state practices, and the transformative 
movements they are part of. Resistance here is employed to denote social acts, ranging from 
the discrete to the spectacular, which are organised in order to communicate opposition to 
events, regimes or social systems, and to bring about some form of emancipatory 
transformation (Stanley and McCulloch, 2012: 4-5). As Stanley and McCulloch observe, ‘the 
scope of activities that might be defined as resistance is broad. It may be violent or non-
violent, passive or active, hidden or open, verbal or physical, spontaneous or strategic, local 
or global, and frequently a combination of some or all’ (2012: 4). If we fuse this concept of 
resistance to the approach forged by Green and Ward, our focus becomes more honed. We 
are concerned not only with how communities resist, but how this resistance becomes a 
creative force that converts the contradiction between state practice and hegemonic norms 
into the social property of criminality, through a range of stigmatising acts.  
 
There is also a need to think more deeply about the social realities in which these struggles 
take place, employing theory to enrich our understanding of history from below. Indeed, it is 
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only through articulating, the often elusive, social dynamics that condense in these complex 
social transactions that we can properly disclose the meaning and significance of resistance. It 
is, with that in mind, that we now turn to Marx’s concept of indifference, to aid our 
understanding of the censuring struggles considered in the forthcoming comparative study.  
 
Marx’s theory of indifference 
 
Often overlooked in the literature is the significant treatment of agency in Marx’s thought, 
and the distinctive social ontology this inspired. Simply put, Marx argues that in abstraction 
from society, individual beings are only human potential. This potential assumes particular 
historical forms – with a distinct range of characteristics and abilities – through the 
participation of actualising subjects in practices that are prompted by the relationally bound 
processes, around which social life is organised (Marx, 1973: 265). Out of this dynamic 
emerges the possibility that certain paths of practical existence can cultivate within 
organisationally based actors, priorities, attitudes, values, and objectives, which are not only 
condemned as wrong by others, but elicit direct forms of sanction. The challenge here is to 
understand the historically mediated character of this antagonistic process. 
 
With respect to the latter point, Marx contends that capitalism engenders in those who 
manage and oversee the circulation of capital, what he calls an ‘indifference’ towards the 
human calamities their actions produce (Marx, 1973: 163). He writes, ‘capital is reckless of 
the health or length of life of the labourer, unless under compulsion from society’ (italics 
added) (Marx, 1976: 381). Marx continues, ‘[capitalist production] squanders human beings, 
living labour, more readily than does any other mode of production, squandering not only 
flesh and blood, but nerves and brain as well’ (Marx, 1981: 182).  
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He attempts to explain this reckless indifference in the first instance by examining how 
surplus labour is extracted from the immediate producer under capitalism. To that end, Marx 
observes, commodities possess value only in so far as they are the crystallisation of human 
labour as measured by the socially necessary labour time required for their production (Marx, 
1976: 128-29).  
 
With this social dynamic in mind, Marx describes capital as ‘value for-itself’ (1973: 456). 
That is, capital accumulates by putting value into motion, so that it passes through a 
succession of different stages (i.e. money-capital à productive-capital à commodity-
capitalà money-capital), which gives it command over social labour time, and value 
producing labour. As a unified whole these stages form what Marx calls the circuit of 
industrial capital (1978: 183). Through navigating this circuit capital is fertilised by labour, 
thus allowing the initial sum of value invested to be both preserved and augmented, i.e. 
‘value for-itself’ (Marx, 1973: 313). As this circuit frenetically turns over, the social 
interconnections between human beings, and those between human beings and nature, 
become increasingly subordinated to a process of expanded value production, spurred by 
capital’s ‘boundless thirst for surplus labour’ (Marx, 1976: 345).  
  
This ‘ceaseless augmentation of value’ (Marx, 1976: 254), Marx argues, stimulates practices 
that display indifference to certain features of the process through which ‘value for-itself’ 
must pass in its valorising journey (1973: 224). For instance, he contends, ‘capitalist 
production … is indifferent to the particular use-values it produces, and in fact to the specific 
character of its commodities in general. All that matters in any sphere of production is to 
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produce surplus-value, to appropriate a definite quantity of unpaid labour in labour’s product’ 
(Marx, 1981: 297-98).  
 
Accordingly, it may be hypothesised that those responsible for capital’s valorisation, 
actualise their human potential through practical life-activity that impresses worth on a range 
of intricate processes essential to value’s preservation and augmentation. On the other hand, 
matters that do not impinge in any meaningful sense on the latter, including for instance 
environmental harm or the squandering of human life, fail to assume a lived importance, even 
when the organisational actors concerned have the capacity to recognise the wrongfulness of 
these outcomes. The seeds are thus being laid here for the forms of contention that inspire 
resistance and stigmatising sanctions delivered from below.  
 
When we add state-power to the equation the argument must be modified, but not abandoned. 
For Marx the state assumes a particular historical form under capitalism, where its juridical 
and political technologies are appropriated to manage the production and circulation of value. 
To that end, capitalist state-power is a social force which stimulates, intensifies, guides, and 
secures circulating values as they pass through key stages in the valorisation process. The 
state also protects and reinforces the class arrangements that permit this process to occur.  
Thus, state-power governs the value economy through which capitalism functions, in all its 
diverse manifestations, and always with an overriding mandate to keep value flowing through 
its different moments, which is decisive if social reproduction is to occur, and governing 
priorities are to be achieved (Foucault, 2007: 64-5). As a result, state-managers, through their 
practical existence, also develop priorities that necessarily reflect the law of value, and the 
forms of indifference it prompts.  
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It is in the context of this indifference inculcated by the dynamics of capital accumulation, 
that we argue sabotage becomes an external force employed by civil society to challenge 
capital’s alienated position in relation to certain calamities it helps generate. Sabotage, as 
resistance, emerged briefly in the criminological discourse of the ‘new criminology’ in the 
early 1970s. Taylor and Walton argued that sabotage was effectively an inchoate and 
unarticulated form of resistance to capitalist exploitation, an attempt by workers to ameliorate 
the effects of alienating labour (Taylor and Walton, 1971). In this article we explore 
sabotage, not as an individualised, unconscious act of the powerless against the process of 
distant capital, but as a form of conscious activism designed to challenge the indifference to 
human suffering encouraged by capital’s pursuit of profit.  
            
Censuring through sabotage: The cases of Northern Ireland and Bougainville 
 
Introduction 
 
The following comparative study was prompted by one of the author’s work on the 
militarised state-corporate reaction to a sabotage campaign organised by traditional 
landowning communities on Bougainville (Lasslett, 2014). While Lasslett’s initial research 
focused on the organisation of state-corporate deviance, landowner resistance became the 
subject of interest in 2013-14, as part of an ESRC-funded study on civil society conducted by 
the International State Crime Initiative (www.statecrime.org). A more recent case  (that of the 
Raytheon 9), was selected for comparison on the basis of four criteria identified in the 
Bougainville study: the use of sabotage as a technique to prosecute censure of state-corporate 
deviance; evidence that sabotage succeeded in achieving, to an extent, censure and 
prohibition (we wanted to understand how and why); the possibility of accessing key 
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organisers of the sabotage action; and, the existence of contextual difference that would 
enable us to explore whether general social drivers could be identified in both campaigns. 
The two empirical examples employed here may be considered exploratory cases, which 
present primary evidence on a phenomenon that has yet to be considered in the field; and by 
comparing distinct historical articulations of this phenomenon our aim is to better theorise the 
social transactions which sabotage facilitates.  
 
In both cases purposive sampling was employed to identify relevant participants and 
documents. To that end, where possible, the key organisers of the sabotage actions were 
interviewed,2 while internal documentation relating to the campaigns was obtained using, 
inter alia, archival searches and freedom of information requests, which in particular helped 
evidence the state-corporate reaction.  
 
It should also be noted that the two cases were not compared in order to discover descriptive 
patterns from which abstract generalisations on the causation of state crime and resistance 
might be inductively generated. Rather, our aim has been to illuminate the social processes 
which framed sabotage’s employment, and criminological significance, in both cases – 
processes that are not always apparent from the vantage point of sense-perception. And in so 
doing we wished to determine whether a common social thread could be observed within 
these two distinct articulations of sabotage. In this sense the goal of the research has been 
largely exploratory, that is, to frame sabotage as a method of protest against state-corporate 
crime that also helps constitute state-corporate crime itself as a construct. In so doing the 
analysis of the selected case-studies serves to reveal a fundamental challenge to the problem 
of “indifference” (or harm-producing capital) identified in Marxist theory.  
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In presenting our findings we note that the particular forms of indifference that are the subject 
of resistance in this study have a range of distinguishing qualities which we will first outline, 
before moving on to examine the mediating role played by the state. Attention will then be 
turned to the movements of resistance that arose in opposition to state-corporate deviance, 
and the impact of the sabotage campaigns they organised. This will lay the foundation for a 
series of theoretical propositions developed in this article’s final section. 
 
The emergence of contested industries 
 
We begin with the case of Bougainville, an island on Papua New Guinea’s eastern border, 
where a large copper and gold mine became the subject of a prolonged campaign of censure 
organised by surrounding landowning communities.3 In the first instance, the mine’s 
emergence and operation presupposed global capitalism’s frenetic expansion, which increases 
the demand for raw materials (Marx, 1981: 201). Attached to this dynamic is a social impulse 
which sees gradual reductions in the social labour time expended in the extraction of raw 
materials, an impulse that is concretely experienced by specific mining capitals as a 
competitive drive to become, or remain, a low-cost producer (see Lasslett, 2014). On 
Bougainville, this translated into the arrival of a major mining conglomerate, Rio Tinto 
(through its subsidiary Bougainville Copper), which erected a sophisticated extractive 
apparatus designed to efficiently exhume large tonnages of copper and gold. The size and 
character of this apparatus not only demanded significant tracts of land, its operation would 
also have a seismic impact on the surrounding ecosystem and communities.  
 
The comparator case from Northern Ireland centres on the arms industry, whose most socially 
provocative feature is prompted by the consumption of the use-values it creates, i.e. weapons. 
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Demand for these use-values is, in part, connected to the social drives which are generated by 
an international system of state-power, whose constituting units are competing nation-states 
of varying size and capacity. In this context, military power is one means by which states can 
exercise social control at home and shape the global governance of the international economy 
(Kiely, 2010). The pressures and geopolitical anxieties these intersecting roles generate create 
an enduring demand for armaments of growing sophistication. However, the weapon 
industry’s growth can also be linked to the intrinsic dynamics of capitalist production. By 
increasing social productivity, capitalism frees up social labour time for productive use, 
which in turn drives capital to both develop new use-values for consumption, and transform 
the character of existing use-values (Marx, 1973: 224). With respect to arms, this translates 
into an industry that perpetually advances weapons technologies, and pro-actively cultivates 
markets through which to realise the value embedded in weapon systems.  
 
Of course, the emergence of industries – whether mining or arms – within particular 
geographies is rarely accidental. On Bougainville the Australian colonial administration 
mapped and advertised the island’s resources during the 1960s, as part of a broader drive to 
accelerate inward investment in the lead up to self-government in Papua New Guinea (see 
Lasslett, 2014). When Rio Tinto signalled its interest a generous package of tax exemptions 
was offered to secure their half-billion dollar (US$) investment.  
 
In Northern Ireland, significant incentives were also offered to attract the investment of 
international defence contractor, Raytheon, as part of the so called “peace dividend”. In 
addition to advertising the region’s cheap labour costs, and skilled work-force, the 
government’s investment arm – the Industrial Development Board, which would later be 
rebranded Invest NI – emphasised the lucrative public subsidies that were available. Indeed, 
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to attract Raytheon’s £3.5 million investment, a grant of £1.25 million was offered (Industrial 
Development Board, 1999), on a ‘non-repayable [basis] provided the company achieved its 
[employment] objectives [of 150 staff]’ (Invest NI, 2003b).  
 
The Northern Irish government believed that Raytheon’s presence in the city of Derry would 
act as a powerful beacon for further foreign investment. This, in turn, would help reduce the 
city’s rate of unemployment, which stood at 9.3 per cent, against the Northern Ireland 
average of 5.6 per cent (McGurk, 2000: 41). However, there were concerns that as a weapons 
manufacturer, Raytheon’s presence may attract criticism. To minimise local resistance, the 
investment’s principal architect – the Member of the Legislative Assembly for Foyle, John 
Hume – made an agreement with Raytheon. A Director at Raytheon’s British subsidiary, 
Raytheon Systems Limited (Raytheon Systems), would later recount its content to the 
Northern Ireland Secretary: ‘There was a verbal agreement that we would not carry out 
defence work in Londonderry. The exact terms of this verbal agreement are not known, but 
we do not believe that it had any legal status’ (Raytheon Systems, 2002b). When Raytheon’s 
arrival was formally announced in August 1999, at the Derry Guildhall, audiences were told 
its Northern Ireland Systems and Software Centre, would be a civilian contractor supporting 
‘a variety of Raytheon's electronics programmes, including air traffic control systems for 
European and other airports’ (Raytheon Systems, 1999).   
 
The evolution of resistance  
 
In both cases local resistance to the inward investment was almost instantaneous. On 
Bougainville, communities in the mine area contested the expropriation of their land, and 
once mine operations began they lobbied for increased compensation through the Panguna 
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Landowners Association (PLA), which became the representative body for mine-affected 
communities. Resistance, however, assumed a more radical posture during the late 1980s, as 
certain seismic shifts in the region’s social and environmental fabric were felt (see Lasslett, 
2014).  
For instance, changes in rural production – specifically the growth of cash-cropping and 
certain tertiary industries – had prompted land shortages, social differentiation, inequality, 
and the individuation of household interests. The opening of the mine accelerated this process 
of change, and heightened tensions within communities. In addition to this, the mine’s 
considerable environmental impacts became a catalysing symbol of injustice. Indeed, the 
disposal of mine tailings had devastating effects on the local terrain, including the Jaba river, 
while the process of ore extraction is also said to have contributed to erosion, flooding, 
chemical pollution, air pollution, and the contamination of drinking water, all of which 
decimated surrounding animal and marine life, and harmed the health of village communities 
(Böge, 1995; Connell, 1991; Jubilee Australia, 2014; Vernon, 2005). 
   
These social and environmental impacts provoked a significant shift within the PLA. A new 
generation of leaders emerged representing less advantaged households who had borne the 
brunt of the inequalities and environmental damage. Two of these leaders, Francis Ona and 
Perpetua Serero, challenged the PLA executive to an election, and won in August 1987. 
Whereas the previous executive had been reformist, Ona and Serero promoted a 
revolutionary agenda that drew on customary land rights as a vehicle for expropriating 
Bougainville Copper. In its place, they championed an ecologically-sustainable path of 
development. This path, they believed, required a radical transformation of the island’s 
political economy, which Ona claimed catered ‘for the few capitalists whose hunger for 
wealth is quenchless and unceasing’ (1989).  
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During 1988 the PLA loudly condemned the environmental effects of Bougainville Copper’s 
operation. To that end, they demanded the mine’s closure, and the payment of compensation 
(US$12 billion) for environmental destruction (Bougainville Copper, 1988b; PLA, 1988a & 
1988b). Bougainville Copper rejected both demands (Bougainville Copper, 1988a).   
 
The censure of Raytheon also formed part of a broader movement of resistance.  However, in 
the Northern Irish case it was the industries that enabled imperial violence and war-making 
that were to be the focus. The most active organisations in this respect were the Derry Anti-
War Coalition (DAWC) and the Foyle Ethical Investment Campaign (FEIC).   
 
DAWC emerged during the first Gulf War, and had become the main organisational 
framework for Derry activists opposing imperialist violence. To that end, they had organised 
against the US-UK invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, Russian military aggression in 
Chechnya, China’s occupation of Tibet, and the NATO bombing of the former Yugoslavia. 
FEIC, on the other hand, was focused on promoting alternatives to the arms industry. A 
member of FEIC explained, ‘we very deliberately said this is not just about saying no to 
particular developments, it’s also about saying yes to ethical investment’.4 Uniting both 
groups was an overlapping membership strongly grounded in socialist traditions of collective 
organisation, enacted through historical engagement with a range of environmental, trade-
union, civil rights, and anti-imperial struggles. 
 
DAWC-FEIC’s joint opposition to Raytheon’s investment, was based on two core arguments. 
First, Raytheon’s products had caused mass-civilian casualties. A FEIC campaigner observes: 
‘Raytheon as a corporation is a mass murderer on a global scale … they are in the business of 
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terror and there is no other word for it’.5 There was also a view that Raytheon had become a 
significant player in the military-industrial complex. ‘I knew enough about arms companies’, 
claims one DAWC activist, ‘to know that they lobbied not just for higher arms spending but 
specifically to support war, and would urge governments towards particular wars, and the 
Raytheon company was very much in the forefront’.6 As a result, DAWC-FEIC embarked 
upon a prolonged campaign to publicly illuminate Raytheon’s criminogenic role in the 
military-industrial complex, and to remove their operations from Derry. 
 
Mass-mobilisation and censure  
  
In both the instance of the PLA and DAWC-FEIC, movement organisers spent considerable 
time building alliances and generating popular support. For DAWC-FEIC the invasion of 
Afghanistan and Iraq proved a catalysing event which attracted significant numbers to the 
cause. Drawing on this growing support base, they were able to organise frequent protests, 
and direct action, such as the March 2003 occupation of Raytheon’s premises, which 
followed the dropping of a Raytheon bomb on a Baghdad marketplace, killing 62 people 
(Milmo, 2003).7  
 
The PLA also forged a strong local support base. Most critically, strategic alliances were 
made with sympathetic Chiefs. One notable inclusion was Damien Dameng, a traditional 
leader who had a following of around 4,000 villagers in the Kongara region, south-west of 
the mine (Oliver, 1991: 180-81). With his assistance the PLA was able to organise a 
demonstration against the mine in March 1988 with around 400 marchers, they also 
implemented road-blocks and lobbied provincial and national politicians.    
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Initially, the respective corporate interests in Derry and Bougainville underestimated the 
censuring movements opposing them. For example, following a meeting with Raytheon 
Systems on 18 May 2000, the Industrial Development Board noted: ‘The consensus … is that 
the issue is being driven by only a very small number of people’ (Industrial Development 
Board, 2000). Two years later in a letter to the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Investment, 
Raytheon Systems confidently noted ‘we do monitor their activities closely to ensure it does 
not get out of hand’ (Raytheon Systems, 2002a). Bougainville Copper was also initially 
unalarmed by the PLA’s campaign. Indeed, senior management viewed the new PLA 
leadership as ‘try-ons’,8 who were ‘not fully representative’ of the community (Quodling, 
1991: 57).  
 
However, corporate anxieties increased in both cases when it became apparent that there was 
some formal political support for the respective resistance movements. In DAWC-FEIC’s 
case they had obtained Derry City Council’s support. This resulted in the unanimous passing 
of a special motion on 7 January 2004, which stated: ‘Council had received assurances that 
the Raytheon facility here in Derry would only be engaged in activities that had civilian 
applications … Council acknowledges that Raytheon’s core global business is the arms trade 
… Council wants no part of that trade in this city’ (cited in McCann, 2006). This motion 
came at an inopportune time for Raytheon Systems, who were in the process of shifting their 
Derry focus to weapons-systems. 
 
This shift was first signalled in December 2002 when Raytheon Systems privately informed 
the Northern Ireland Secretary: ‘We have limited the business to non-defence work which has 
unfortunately resulted in only 40% of the revenue required to sustain and grow the business. 
Consequently we have not been able to increase the number of employees in line with the 
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conditions of the grants received’ (Raytheon Systems, 2002b). In a subsequent meeting with 
Invest NI, Raytheon Systems noted ‘that opportunities in the UK military arena are mega’ 
(Invest NI, 2003a). By August 2004, Raytheon Systems confirmed their Derry plant would be 
working on the Ministry of Defence’s Joint Effects Targeting System a project that aimed ‘to 
improve … operational capability in the battlespace by enhancing the combat effects of 
tempo, simultaneity, surprise, tactical agility, lethality and survivability, all whilst reducing 
fratricide’ (Invest NI, 2004a; Raytheon Systems, 2004; Raytheon Systems, 2006). Several 
months later Raytheon Systems also informed Invest NI that the Derry office was likely to be 
involved in ‘deconfliction work’:   
 
 [This] will allow various vehicles e.g. land vehicles, planes, shells etc. all to be 
assessed in real time. In addition stationary items e.g. schools, enemy bunkers will also 
be considered all in order to allow military objectives to be achieved e.g. the dropping 
of humanitarian aid, or other goals. (Invest NI, 2004b)  
As a result of the transition, Raytheon Systems was aware it needed to sure up political 
support.  
 
With Invest NI’s assistance, the company lobbied the government during 2004. By January 
the following year, Raytheon System’s Director of Engineering Technology, Alan 
McCormick, confirmed relations had improved with the Derry City Council. Invest NI notes, 
‘McCormick thanked Invest NI for its support during this period, including our input to the 
Derry Council situation. It appears that the current mayor (Sinn Fein) is very supportive’ 
(Invest NI, 2005b). Raytheon Systems, however, agreed that no press release would be issued 
advertising their new defence contracts, instead ‘the company will continue its policy of 
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maintaining a low profile whilst continuing to work with local charitable initiatives’ (Invest 
NI, 2005a).  
 
In contrast, Bougainville Copper had a more turbulent relationship with Papua New Guinea 
state officials. Following a 25 November 1988 meeting with government Ministers, 
Bougainville Copper’s Managing Director recalls, ‘I fairly quickly gained the impression that 
it was BCL [Bougainville Copper] more than the Landowners who were considered 
responsible for the problems that had arisen’ (Bougainville Copper, 1988e). The different 
political response here can be explained, in part, by the nature of Bougainville Copper’s 
investment. Unlike Raytheon, it had embedded significant quantities of capital in an 
extractive apparatus. Thus the company was heavily anchored to Bougainville, making it 
more vulnerable to political demands. Compounding matters, the influential Minister for 
Provincial Affairs – who was an MP for Bougainville – along with the head of Bougainville’s 
provincial government, both felt that the company benefited from an unfair revenue-sharing 
agreement, negotiated during the colonial period. Accordingly, they leveraged the PLA’s 
activities to lobby cabinet and Bougainville Copper for changes to the arrangement. That 
said, the use of sabotage would illuminate the state’s ultimate priority in both cases. 
 
Sabotaging the means of production 
 
In the lead-up to the sabotage campaigns, both social movements sensed the limitations of 
their existing tactics. ‘Everything else had been tried, that’s the point’, remembers one 
Raytheon campaigner, ‘we had marched, we had visits to the local council, we made 
delegations twice, we had written to news, MPs and so forth’.9 Similarly, despite wide-
ranging protests, petitions, road-blocks and political lobbying the PLA had also failed to 
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achieve its campaign objectives. Francis Ona’s frustration was evident at a 31 July 1988 
meeting. ‘We the landowners will close the mine’, he claimed, ‘we are not worried about 
money. Money is something nothing. The operation is causing hazards healthwise. We don’t 
want to talk anymore’ (Bougainville Copper, 1988c). 
 
There was also, in both instances, a specific triggering event. For DAWC-FEIC, it was an 
Israel Defence Force missile attack which destroyed an apartment block in the Lebanese town 
of Qana on 30 July 2006 (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Twenty-seven people were killed, 16 
of whom were children. The missiles derived from an MK-86 guided bomb unit (GBU), 
manufactured by Raytheon (Fisk, 2006: 1). Eamonn McCann, a Raytheon 9 activist recalls, 
‘we knew immediately that the GBU was associated with the Derry plant because we had 
done enough research … to know … that the electronics being produced at the Derry plant 
were involved specifically in the production of GBUs’.10  
 
DAWC-FEIC activists involved in the subsequent sabotage campaign, identify two principal 
motivations. First, they had a duty under international law to inhibit the Israel Defence 
Force’s capacity to attack civilian targets, ‘even for only minutes or an hour’.11 A Raytheon 9 
activist explains, ‘the Raytheon plant in Derry was part of the global link up where the 
technology that was being used for bunker buster bombs, that have been delivered on 
Lebanon, was being developed in Derry. So there was an idea that if you could get in and 
destroy the actual means of production in the Raytheon plant in Derry then you can stop 
bombs hitting Lebanon’.12 Second, it was now felt that something drastic was needed to 
censure Raytheon Systems, and their state supporters: ‘[We] were also dramatising the issue, 
showing the city that [Raytheon’s Derry plant] … which has been defended by some local 
politicians, was directly implicated in war crimes’.13  
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On Bougainville the triggering event was of a different character. In August 1988, the Papua 
New Guinea government contracted a consultancy firm, Applied Geology Associates, to 
conduct an inquiry into the social and environmental impacts of the Bougainville mine. To 
the PLA’s surprise, the consultants concluded at a public meeting in November 1988 that 
‘BCL [Bougainville Copper] has done good work’ (Bougainville Copper, 1988d). The PLA’s 
Secretary stormed out declaring the inquiry a ‘whitewash’.14 A ‘special operations planning 
committee’ set up by the PLA, then decided only sabotage could ‘put a quick end to all this 
arguing and environmental damage’.15  
 
Once triggered both sabotage operations were successfully carried out. In Derry, nine 
activists gained entry to Raytheon’s premises on 9 August 2006, while around 100 stood 
outside in solidarity. Employees were asked to leave.16 An hour later, activists 
decommissioned the plant by pouring water on the computer mainframe that linked the centre 
to Raytheon worldwide.17 Several computers were also thrown out the office window. A 
banner was then unfurled, stating ‘Raytheon has been decommissioned’.  
 
An elaborate police operation was implemented in response. Goretti Horgan, a DAWC-FEIC 
activist remembers: ‘The police actually sent hostage negotiators, they actually flew in by 
helicopter, as if there were hostages … So that’s also what people saw on their TV screens, 
they saw them being treated as dangerous criminals’.18 One Raytheon 9 activist recalls their 
trepidation upon seeing the force marshalled against them: ‘My first thought was of my 
family because I thought … “you’re not getting slapped on the wrist for this” … which, I  
understand, was the point, we needed to highlight Raytheon and it turned out that that was the 
best way to do it’.19  
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The police entered the premises in the late afternoon, using chainsaws to break through a 
blockade. One of the Raytheon 9 recalls, ‘[40 police] smashed through the doors wearing riot 
gear, many holding Perspex shields, some pointing plastic-bullet guns’ (McCann cited in 
Steel, 2008: 30). They were met by nine activists playing cards.20 The Raytheon 9 were 
arrested, held in custody, and subsequently charged with three counts of criminal damage and 
affray, while two were also charged for the theft of computer disks. One of the activists 
recalls, ‘we were very happy to accept the consequences’, indeed the trial was an integral 
feature of the group’s strategy to censure Raytheon.21 In this respect, the Raytheon 9 tactics 
drew from a tradition initiated in the US by the Plowshare movement; made up mainly of 
Christian pacifists, Plowshare activists appropriated arrest, and prosecution, as forums 
through which to censure organisational actors implicated in the military-industrial complex 
(see Nepstad, 2008: 78–82).    
 
Northern Ireland’s political establishment was united in its condemnation of the saboteurs. 
Mark Durkan, the MP for Foyle, claimed ‘people are … free to express opposition to the 
arms trade and the role of a company like Raytheon at a global level within that. But 
destroying property and possibly prejudicing other investment and employment prospects is 
not the way to register such concerns’ (cited in Pogatchnik, 2006). According to one of the 
Raytheon 9, Eamonn O’Donnell, ‘even our own local parties turned against us…of course, 
the right wing parties and the DUP [Democratic Unionist Party] would condemn it, but our 
own, Sinn Féin, they didn’t want to know’. 22 
 
On Bougainville sabotage was conducted covertly, under the cover of night on 25/26 
November 1988, and culminated in a number of dramatic operations where high voltage 
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transmission towers were felled using dynamite. Bougainville Copper labelled the operation, 
‘highly organised terrorism by the Landowner party under [the] directions of Francis Ona’ 
(Bougainville Copper, 1988f). The company’s Managing Director told government Ministers 
that it was necessary ‘to apply the law first, i.e. charge and deal with those involved’ 
(Bougainville Copper, 1988f). However, Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister rejected 
Bougainville Copper’s proposal and instead sent a peace delegation to the island. The 
company’s Chairman informed Directors at Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA), 
Bougainville Copper’s immediate parent: ‘The PM’s priority was to “appease” the 
landowners. I expressed the view that CRA would want to review its assessment of PNG 
[Papua New Guinea] as a place to invest’ (Bougainville Copper, 1988g). The Prime Minister 
was, however, unmoved by the Chairman’s threat.  
 
The aftermath 
 
For DAWC-FEIC, the Raytheon 9 trial proved to be the validating forum they had hoped for. 
Indeed, the case attracted wide support from prominent public intellectuals, in addition to a 
range of anti-war organisations. DAWC-FEIC also organised regular protests to coincide 
with the court appearances. The defence team argued that their clients had a lawful excuse 
under Article 7 of The Criminal Damage (Northern Ireland) Order 1977, as the damage was 
inflicted in an honest belief it would help to protect the property of Lebanese citizens from 
being destroyed by the Israel Defence Force. To that end, Raytheon’s complicity in Israel 
Defence Force war crimes was a central feature of the defence’s case. Indeed, at one point 
during the trial the judge warned a Raytheon Systems witness that he was at risk of self-
incrimination.23  
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The jury acquitted the Raytheon 9 on 11 June 2008. One of the exonerated activists, Eamonn 
McCann, informed supporters outside the courtroom:  
 
The jury has accepted that we were reasonable in our belief that: the Israel Defence 
Forces were guilty of war crimes in Lebanon in the summer of 2006; that the Raytheon 
company, including its facility in Derry, was aiding and abetting the commission of 
these crimes; and that the action we took was intended to have, and did have, the effect 
of hampering or delaying the commission of war crimes. (Raytheon 9, 2008) 
 
The success of the campaign, and their its subsequent vindication by the courts, led DAWC-
FEIC to organise another sabotage action after Raytheon weaponry was employed by the 
Israel Defence Force during Operation Cast Lead. When activists were unable to reach the 
computer mainframe they chained themselves to the internal door. The occupation ended 
when police agreed to investigate Raytheon’s complicity in Israeli war crimes – no 
investigation was subsequently conducted.24  
 
The embarrassment caused to the Northern Ireland government by the second act of sabotage 
was registered in a letter to Raytheon Systems sent by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and 
Investment: ‘I wanted to take this opportunity to write to you following the disgraceful events 
that occurred at Raytheon’s NISSC [Northern Ireland Systems and Software Centre] facility 
on January 12th and to reaffirm my strong and continuing support for Raytheon’s valuable 
presence in Northern Ireland’ (Foster, 2009). The activists involved were once again 
acquitted by the courts.  
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Invest NI records suggest Raytheon was dismayed by the attacks, and subsequent jury 
decision: ‘Unfortunately, it would appear that the view of senior US management is that the 
legal system in Northern Ireland does not offer the degree of protection to their business that 
could be expected in other parts of the world’ (cited in Mullin, 2010). Of particular 
importance here was the classified nature of the work conducted at Raytheon’s Derry office, 
which made repeated breaches of security especially problematic (see Raytheon, 2010: 19). 
Despite offers of further government support and financial assistance, Raytheon Systems 
closed its Derry plant in February 2010.  
 
In contrast, Bougainville Copper’s departure occurred under more spectacular and violent 
circumstances. Although an amnesty was initially offered to the PLA leadership, Papua New 
Guinea’s Police Commissioner defied cabinet wishes and ordered their arrest. Following 
violent police raids, the PLA leadership escaped into the Kongara region under Damien 
Dameng’s protection, where they formed the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. Having in 
place a defensive buffer landowners resumed the sabotage campaign during May 1989, 
felling transmission towers, and this time also firing upon a Bougainville Copper bus convoy. 
 
The company’s Managing Director immediately wrote to Papua New Guinea’s Prime 
Minister, insisting on the need for an authoritative response (Bougainville Copper, 1989a). 
Unlike Raytheon, Bougainville Copper was anchored to a geographically specific ore body, 
which needed to be extracted by labour over an especially prolonged period in order to 
progressively realise the extensive investment of (constant) capital in mine infrastructure. 
Thus for Bougainville Copper, stability meant ensuring their long term tenure at Panguna. In 
contrast for Raytheon it correlated more closely with the sanctity of their premises, which 
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could be moved if need be to more fortified areas without significant loss. These important 
differences mediated the respective corporate reactions. 
 
Working in Bougainville Copper’s favour, a cabinet reshuffle had given rise to an influential 
‘hawk’ faction at a time when government finances were seriously affected by the sabotage 
campaign – the mine generated ‘24 per cent of total government revenue’ (Namaliu, 1995: 
61). On the 8 June 1989, Bougainville Copper’s Managing Director was informed by the 
Minister of State that the Papua New Guinea Defence Force was planning to ‘neutralise’ the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army through ‘brutal firepower’ (Bougainville Copper, 1989b). 
To aid the offensive, Bougainville Copper supplied trucks, fuel, messing facilities, 
accommodation, storage space, office blocks, and secretarial support to the troops (see 
Lasslett, 2014). Papua New Guinea’s main strategic partner, Australia, contributed 
armaments, helicopters, and military advisors.   
 
Employing this assistance, Papua New Guinea launched a series of counterinsurgency 
operations (see Lasslett, 2014). Dozens of villages around the mine were burnt, and their 
residents placed in internment camps. The Papua New Guinea Defence Force also bombarded 
civilian areas with 81mm mortar rounds, and helicopter gunfire. Those suspected of 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army collaboration were frequently tortured and then executed. 
In response, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army condemned these atrocities as a violation 
of international law, and drew on the visceral emotions they provoked, to increase their 
support base and mobilise the island behind secession, which they argued, was the only 
viable political mechanism for achieving justice (Ona, 1989). By 1990 the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army enjoyed island wide support. As a result, Bougainville Copper withdrew 
from the island, with the last employees leaving in February 1990. A military blockade was 
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then placed around Bougainville by the Papua New Guinea government, cutting off 
humanitarian supplies – renewed military efforts followed. The conflict continued for another 
seven years before a cease fire was reached. By then, however, approximately 10,000 people 
had lost their lives. To this day the mine remains closed, and the surrounding area is heavily 
guarded by ex-combatants who oppose Rio Tinto’s return. 
 
Theoretical conclusions 
 
As we noted above, a problem associated with criteria-based definitions of state crime is that 
they risk omitting from the field, practices essential to the historical actuality of state crime. 
Indeed, in both the cases examined here, deviant state-corporate conduct did not in itself 
inscribe the operations and operators with the quality of being criminal (though they were 
essential preconditions). Rather, the way communities converged into resistance movements, 
and the techniques these movements employed to expose and condemn, proved of critical 
importance. 
 
In the latter respect, sabotage had a number of specific qualities that helped facilitate censure 
and control. First, the act itself, which in both cases was deliberately spectacular, provided a 
dramatic way through which to impress the point that the means of production had 
specifically destructive qualities which breached elementary conduct norms. Second, the 
resort to sabotage, as a final act in a prolonged campaign of peaceful resistance, powerfully 
exposed state complicity in deviant corporate activity. Indeed in both cases it compelled the 
state to openly abandon its ‘neutral’ role, and prioritise capital over life and environment. 
Third, the enactment of sabotage demanded a visible display of self-sacrifice by those 
condemning state-corporate deviance – at the very least their liberty was at stake. Through 
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acts of self-sacrifice activists inscribed both worth and meaning on the victims of the 
censured practices, and at the same time ascribed wrongfulness to the state-corporate 
perpetrators. Finally, sabotage also generated a new site of contestation in which activists 
could manoeuvre to amplify the effects of their protest. DAWC-FEIC, for instance, employed 
their appearance before the courts, as a site in which to engage in counter-hegemonic 
practices. In so doing they subverted a space of discipline, and employed it to amplify the 
censuring power of sabotage. On Bougainville, where the state’s punitive response assumed a 
more brutal form, rebel landowners harnessed state terror to legitimise their campaign against 
Bougainville Copper, and to mobilise on a scale that was previously unthinkable, employing 
secession as an organising framework. As a result of these efforts, there remains a vocal ban 
on industrial-scale mining in the Panguna region enforced from below; while the success of 
the Derry activists has become a powerful symbol frequently cited in the ongoing campaign 
against the arms trade. 
  
Of course, there are other dimensions of these struggles which we argue are best captured 
drawing on Marx’s social ontology, and theory of capitalism. To that end, in the cases 
examined here, we have suggested those in positions of corporate power experienced a mode 
of life that overwhelmingly engendered care – in a mediated sense – for the intricate ways in 
which value, is applied and then realised. For state-officials, this concern had a definite 
geopolitical dimension to it, with the focus being on how value embeds and circulates, and its 
consequential effects upon governing priorities. The resultant ecological damage/war crimes 
were matters of no practical importance or meaningful consequence, removed as they were 
from the immediacy of value’s circulation. Indeed, Bougainville Copper’s drive to act as 
value for-itself meant its management primarily experienced the surrounding ecosystem as a 
physical barrier to the ore body in need of efficient removal, and an inexpensive receptacle 
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for mine waste. The environmental harms being challenged by landowners were also of 
minor lived importance for state actors, compared that is with their significant lived 
experience of the mine’s impact on the state’s fiscal life.  
 
Similarly, in the instance of Derry, the end use of certain Raytheon products (i.e. killing 
human beings), and the negative reaction it might elicit, was primarily experienced by state-
corporate actors as a barrier to expanded reproduction that needed be overcome. This barrier 
was eventually circumvented through the covert flow of capital into weapons systems. When 
censure was subsequently enacted, state officials overtly prioritised ‘investment’ and 
‘employment’ – despite the small size of the Derry operation – over the 27 lives taken in 
Lebanon, without, that is, repudiating the norms DAWC-FEIC were appealing to. 
Furthermore, when the social priorities generated by practical experience (i.e. the production 
and realisation of value), clashed with the social priorities designated by fundamental human 
rights norms (i.e. the sanctity of human life), state-corporate actors in Northern Ireland 
displayed no evidence of dissonance. This indicates that even where conduct norms are 
accepted by state-corporate actors, their violation does not necessarily invoke a sense of guilt 
or responsibility. We suggest, in this respect, that such indifference arises in situations where 
there is an absence of a meaningful relation with victims – a determination, which is directly 
linked to how practices connect actualising subjects with the social landscape in which they 
operate. 
 
In both cases, the antagonisms cultivated by varied experiences of capitalism’s social 
dynamics, converged most palpably through the medium of sabotage. When indifference 
confronted its opposite, the reaction of state-corporate actors was one of incomprehension, 
outrage, and condemnation. These reactions speak more to a sense of managerial and 
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administrative alienation from the concrete impacts of their actions than they do of 
malevolence. Just as the social product of labour, capital, stands above the worker as an ‘alien 
power that dominates and exploits him’ (Marx, 1976: 716), the disasters which capital 
generates, are realities that its practitioners are disconnected from, and bear no meaningful 
sense of lived responsibility for. Such disconnection also points to the difficulty of 
establishing normative frameworks that can restrain state-corporate deviance, given that the 
very outcomes these norms designate as wrong are commonly experienced by instigating 
actors as both alien and insignificant.  
 
Of course, sabotage is only one, rarely employed form of censure. Nevertheless, we contend 
that it, and other dramatic forms of direct action, are powerful methods of resistance that 
expose, define and challenge state/corporate crimes. While indifference may not have been 
overcome, both acts of sabotage, perhaps because of their confrontational nature, served to 
publicly highlight the integral nature of indifference in state criminality. By forcing state-
corporate criminal actors to make explicit their commitment to capital over human life (and 
therefore their indifference to human suffering) the two cases of sabotage publicly expose the 
raw brutality of state crime and reaffirm the essentially dialectical nature of the processes 
central to its constitution.  
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Notes 
 
1 Bougainville at the time formed part of Papua New Guinea’s North Solomons Province. However, following a 
2001 peace accord it now forms part of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville. 
2 Two key landowner leaders involved in the sabotage campaign, Perpetua Serero and Francis Ona, had by this 
stage passed away from illness. Accordingly we have relied on archival records to document their views. 
Activists closely connected with Ona and Serero were also interviewed. 
3 Ninety-seven percent of land in Papua New Guinea is owned by clans who administer landed property 
according to custom. 
4 Interview, Peter Doran, FEIC, Belfast, 4 October 2013.  
5 Interview, Shane O’Curry, 2013 FEIC, Dublin, 8 September 2013. 
6 Interview, Eamonn McCann, DAWC, Derry, 7 October 2013. 
7 Interview, Colm Bryce, DAWC, Derry, 20 September 2013; Interview, Goretti Horgan, DAWC-FEIC, 
Newtownabbey, 19 August 2013. 
8 Interview, Senior Manager, Bougainville Copper Limited, 7 June 2006. The name and location of company 
personnel and PNG state officials have been anonymised. 
9  Interview, Eamonn McCann, DAWC, Derry, 7 October 2013. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Interview, Eileen Webster, DAWC, Derry, 3 October 2013. 
12 Interview, Davy McAuley, DAWC, Derry 20 September 2013. 
13 Interview, Peter Doran, FEIC, Belfast, 4 October 2013. 
14 Interview, Senior Manager, Bougainville Copper Limited, 7 June 2006. 
15  Interview, Bonabenja, PLA Special Operations Planning Committee, 18 December 2013.  
16 Interview, Goretti Horgan, DAWC-FEIC, Newtownabbey, 19 August 2013. 
17 Interview, Sean Heaton, DAWC, Derry, 18 October 2013. 
18 Interview, Goretti Horgan, DAWC-FEIC, Newtownabbey, 19 August 2013. 
19  Interview, Sean Heaton, DAWC, Derry, 18 October 2013. 
20 Interview, Colm Bryce, DAWC, Derry, 20 September 2013. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Interview, Eamonn O’Donnell, DAWC, Derry, 20 August 2013. 
23 Interview, Colm Bryce, DAWC, Derry, 20 September 2013. 
24  Interview, Goretti Horgan, DAWC-FEIC, Newtownabbey, 19 August 2013. 
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